Is Abbas one vote from Security Council majority?
Author: Ben Caspit
Posted October 9, 2014
In
the 21 years that have passed since the beginning of the Oslo process,
never has there been a situation similar to the current one between the
Israelis and Palestinians: That is to say, total deadlock. There is no
political or diplomatic horizon. No negotiations are underway or
attempts to facilitate them. The two parties are barely in contact.
Summary⎙ Print
Faced with a diplomatic stalemate unprecedented since the Oslo Accord,
the Palestinians have given up on negotiating with Israel, opting
instead to go to the UN Security Council, where they appear on the verge
of securing a majority.
Translator(s)Simon Pompan
To date, there has been only one clear exception, to wit, the second intifada,
which began in 2000. In response, the Israeli government eventually
launched Operation Defensive Shield in 2002. At that time, it was war.
Today, there is no war (as of yet), but there is nothing else either. As
noted, never has there been such a situation since Oslo. Until today,
there was always something in the pipeline: efforts, contacts, new
ideas. Between 1993 and 1996, the Oslo process thrived and boomed before
Labor's Shimon Peres lost in elections to Likud's Benjamin Netanyahu in
the wake of the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995.
Even
Netanyahu had to accept the Oslo Accord, renewing negotiations in
accordance with it. Within this framework, he pulled out of Hebron and
agreed to the 1998 Wye River Memorandum.
Then came Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who sped up talks and then crashed
them at Camp David in 2000. Several new attempts, such as the Taba talks, ensued. Then Barak was unseated by Ariel Sharon.
After
Operation Defensive Shield, Sharon embarked on his Gaza disengagement
plan. There were no real negotiations, yet it heralded a dramatic and
unprecedented diplomatic development, in the framework of which Israel
demonstrated that if it wants, and if it has bold and decisive
leadership, it is capable of withdrawing from territories and
dismantling settlements.
Sharon's
disengagement process emerged as a total failure. Instead of leveraging
the event to push the peace process forward, rebuild Gaza and turn
disengagement into a successful pilot program, a harbinger of peace, the
residents of Gaza used the disengagement to turn Gaza into "Hamastan."
[sic] Yet, when Sharon was replaced as prime minister by Ehud Olmert,
negotiations soared to new heights. This was in part due to the work of
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni with Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei
(aka Abu Alaa), the Annapolis process and the unprecedented peace offer, including maps, that Olmert put before Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.
Then
Netanyahu returned to power. The first two years of his term were
devoted to efforts to renew negotiations, which were being championed,
albeit without significant success, by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton. There was also an unprecedented construction moratorium in the
territories. Eventually negotiations resumed, but they were too little,
too late. There then followed nine months of euphoria, with Secretary
of State John Kerry and special envoy Martin Indyk at work, until the
two parties reached a dead end.
In
the interim, Netanyahu's one term ended and he began another. The two
sides hunkered down but dug in their heels. The Americans came up with a
few ideas, but it was over. This year's Operation Protective Edge was
the coup de grace.
At
the moment, Abbas has slammed the door shut on the peace process.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu has not declared a day of national mourning. He has
had his fill as well. "The Palestinians have realized," a high-ranking
Palestinian official told me at the start of October, "that they have
nothing more to look for in their negotiations with the Jews. It's a
waste of time. We would be better off approaching the international
community directly and try to break the impasse there."
And
Netanyahu? On the one hand, he feels somewhat relieved. Negotiations do
not agree with him. He loses ground with the right wing, taking heavy
flak from his own Likud Party while enhancing the standing of Minister
of Economy and Trade Naftali Bennett and Foreign Minister Avigdor
Liberman. As far as Netanyahu is concerned, the negotiations can
disappear forever. On the flip side, however, this is a perilous notion,
and Netanyahu should break into a sweat at reviewing such a scenario.
What the Palestinians are planning to do in lieu of negotiations is to approach the UN Security Council
with a detailed resolution to establish an independent Palestinian
state side by side with Israel. Abbas, who is almost 80 years old, would
not have reached such a ripe age or attained his position had he not
been a foxy, wise and calculating person.
His
resolution proposal will incorporate all the things the Americans have
already agreed to during the long years of negotiations. The United
States will find it hard to object to such a proposal,
because it does not contain anything substantive that it has not
already supported. Abbas' working assumption, however, is that in the
end, the United States will veto the resolution.
It is against this backdrop that a fierce diplomatic battle
is taking place, with the Palestinians trying to ensure that at least
10 states will support the resolution. According to diplomatic sources,
at the moment they have nine votes. France is vacillating. If France
were ultimately to join the nine others, thus securing the support of
two-thirds of Security Council members, the Palestinians could proceed —
the US veto notwithstanding — to the UN plenary. There, the resolution
would be adopted if backed by a two-thirds majority, which is something
the Palestinians should have no problem securing. The big bank of
Islamic and nonaligned states will vote for them automatically. The
United Nations will recognize an independent Palestinian state.
This
will be a nightmare scenario for Israel, which will find itself in
conflict with a recognized state. On Oct. 3, Sweden's newly elected
prime minister, Stefan Löfven, announced that his country would recognize an independent Palestine. A diplomatic outcry
ensued in Israel, and the Swedish ambassador was summoned for a
démarche at the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem. Sweden published a few
obfuscating clarifications, but when the dust finally settled, it became
apparent that it remained steadfast in its position. Yes, it will
recognize Palestine.
In
Abbas' scenario of his move, the whole world will recognize the new
state. Imagine what will happen in Jerusalem, especially in light of the
new status Abbas will have on behalf of his country to drag Israel into
every conceivable tribunal, chief among them the International Criminal Court of Justice in The Hague.
Is
this all really about to happen? There are indications that it is,
although in the Middle East anything is possible at any given point in
time. Several diplomatic approaches are being explored in Israel. The
one by the right wing, championed by Bennett and supported by most of
Likud, contends that there is no need for negotiations. The Palestinians
are the ones who did not sign Kerry's proposal, which is why they
should call Israel, which must not give up or back down: There is no
room at this time to establish a Palestinian state when the entire
Middle East is on fire, crashing in on us. Period.
Standing
next to them is Netanyahu himself. Ostensibly, he's more pragmatic. He
wants to resume negotiations immediately without preconditions. He has
the support of Knesset member Zachi Hanegbi and Intelligence Minister
Yuval Steinitz as well as a handful of others. This approach is also
supported by Finance Minister Yair Lapid
and Justice Minister Tzipi Livni, although the two of them want real
negotiations, whereas Netanyahu plans to continue his exercise in
futility and kill time. Standing with Netanyahu like a rock is Defense
Minister Moshe Ya'alon. He, too, doesn't believe that there is a
Palestinian partner at this time, but he is well aware of the paramount
importance of holding negotiations, however minimal, between the
parties.
At
the far end of Israel's right wing, as well as that of the left, there
are a few voices (whose numbers have been growing as of late) who
believe that the idea of the two-state solution should be pronounced
dead, and instead, the one-state solution
should be embraced. Radical leftists will see it as a multinational
state of Jews and Muslims, Israelis and Arabs. Those on the right
envision more of an apartheid-like state. While Arabs would enjoy
citizenship, they would not, however, be real partners in running the
affairs of the state.
And
there's something else. There are a few old-time peace militants and
activists working on the fringes of Israel's political-diplomatic
establishment to draft an outline for an Israeli-Palestinian arrangement
that starts with the issues of borders and security. With regard to
these two issues, which Kerry's negotiations should have focused on
during their brief nine-month lifetime, understandings can be quickly
reached. This is what the people involved believe. If this stage is
clearly outlined in a paper, the Israeli government could be toppled on
that basis. Livni and Lapid will unite. Netanyahu's government will
fall. The centrist-left circles will then close ranks behind the
agreement that has been achieved and will go with it into new elections.
Is
this last scenario likely to unfold? It stands a much smaller chance
than Abbas' scenario. Yet, contacts among actors who are not part of the
current official political establishment are taking place on the back
burner. Yet, this does not stop the happy cruise of the Israeli Titanic
toward the Palestinian iceberg. In the end, something from the things
described here is bound to happen.
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