Nuclear Israel: the hidden weapon
It is an open secret that Israel has nuclear weapons. Successive Israeli
governments have consistently refused to confirm or deny that Israel has
nuclear weapons, although the country's friends and foes have considered
Israel a nuclear state for several decades.
According to various sources, the arsenal of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
includes an estimated eighty pre-operational nuclear explosive devices. This
figure is of the same order of magnitude of the number of devices believed to
be held by two non-signatory states of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), namely India and Pakistan i. “Pre-operational” means
that the aforementioned devices require some preliminary assembly work or
their adaptation to delivery systems before they can be considered
“operational”. It is obviously difficult to know for sure how complex such
preliminary procedures would be and how long they would take. Hence, there is
considerable uncertainty regarding the political and military implications of
Israel's ownership of nuclear devices.
Delivery systems for nuclear devices, their type and reach are a decisive issue.
The distinction made between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons was
originally related to their reach, explosive power and precision. Technological
developments in weaponry and delivery systems have blurred somewhat that
distinction. Tactical nuclear weapons are, in principle, designed for regional
theatres of war, whereas strategic nuclear weapons are usually associated to a
greater explosive yield and to long-range delivery vectors (or vehicles) with a
range of at least a few thousand kilometers.
Several sources claim that the IDF has the capability to deliver nuclear
weapons using gravity, i.e. that it can launch nuclear bombs from aircraft onto
targets. This is what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is believed that
F16 fighter-bombers have been fitted to deliver such nuclear devices. Since
1980, it is estimated that Israel has purchased some 300 to 400 of these USmade
aircraft. Over the years, new versions of the original model were acquired
that can be fitted with a range of different weapons and have mid-air refueling
capability. It is also believed that a small number of such aircraft were modified
to be able to safely carry nuclear devices. The conventional F16 service record
includes the raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak in 1981 as well as various
strikes in the Gaza strip. The range of the F16 is of about 1,600 km.
The F16 fighter-bomber used by the Israeli Defense Forces
After 1998, Israel purchased several F-15E (“Strike Eagle”) heavy bombers with
a range of 4,450 km thus acquiring a strategic capability. This aircraft is
manufactured in the USA by Boeing, where it can carry nuclear devices. It is not
known whether it was modified to that effect by the Israeli Defense Forces.
At present, missiles are the preferred system for the delivery of nuclear devices,
carrying the nuclear explosive in their warheads. It is believed that the IDF has
at least 50 land-to-land Jericho II-type missiles with an estimated range of more
than 1,500 km. The Jericho II missile was developed in Israel. Its blueprint was
a less sophisticated missile — Jericho I — originally designed by French
company Dassault and purchased from the French in the 1960s. Jericho II is a
ballistic missile whose features have led some experts to conclude that it only
makes sense as a system for the delivery of nuclear warheads.
In the wake of the development of the Jericho II missile, Israel designed Shavit,
a three-stage rocket that can put a reconnaissance and surveillance satellite
payload into orbit. This led to the development of the Ofek series of increasingly
heavier and more sophisticated satellites. The latest satellite in the series —
Ofek-9 — is thought to have been launched in June 2010 and is believed to
have an image resolution capability at ground-level below 50 cm. The Ofek
satellites are designed and manufactured by IAI (Israeli Aerospace Industries)
for the Israeli Ministry of Defense.
From the viewpoint of nuclear weaponry, it is worth noting that the Shavit rocket
may be converted into a long-range ballistic missile and thus into a strategic
weapon that can deliver a warhead to a maximum range of about 7,000 km
depending on the weight of the explosive device mounted on the rocket's head.
Israel also owns conventional hybrid (diesel-electric) propulsion submarines,
i.e. non-nuclear submarines that are able to launch torpedoes, mines and
cruise missiles. These submarines are known to be Dolphin-class submarines
and are believed to be three in number. They were manufactured in Germany
and purchased for the “sea arm” of the IDF. The Dolphin submarine has 10 halfmeter
diameter launching tubes. The missiles used are US Harpoon-type
missiles that were designed to target ships. The Harpoon missiles can be
modified to deliver nuclear warheads in sea-land strikes. Such a modification
would require the development of a purpose-built nuclear warhead and the
design of a guiding system to be used against land targets. It is not known
whether the Israelis carried out such modifications but it has been ascertained
that the Israeli government tried to obtain long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles
from the USA. These missiles can be launched from submarines and one
version of it is capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. While it is believed that
the US authorities refused to supply such missiles, Israel's attempt at procuring
those systems betrays IDF's willingness to develop an effective operational
nuclear capability.ii
Information regarding tactical nuclear weapons held by Israel could not be
verified. However, there are indications that Israel may have developed and
stockpiled artillery shells and land mines with nuclear explosives.
oOo
Until the mid-20th century, the State of Israel did not have a nuclear industry or
any nuclear reactor. At the end of the 1950s, Israel was supplied with a small
pool-type reactor for research purposes within the framework of the US “Atoms
for Peace” programme. The IRR1 reactor is located in the Sorek nuclear
research centre and is still operational, with a power output of 5 thermal MW iii.
It is similar in its inception and characteristics to the Portuguese reactor that
operates near Sacavém, which was obtained under the same programme albeit
with a power rating of only 1 MW.
Israel has had a second reactor since 1963 — IRR 2 —, which is described as
a “testing” facility. It is a heavy water cooled and moderated nuclear reactor that
lies at the heart of the Negev Nuclear Research Centre (NNRC) close to
Dimona, in the Negev desert. The activities undertaken at NNRC are not under
Dolphin Class Submarine of the Israeli Defence Forces
IAEA supervision and the centre is not open to the agency's inspections.
Originally, the power rating of IRR2 was 16 thermal MW. The current power
rating is unknown but some experts believe it to exceed 100 MW.
A nuclear reactor like IRR 2 can produce significant amounts of plutonium from
the natural uranium that is commonly used as fuel in heavy water cooled and
moderated reactors. Access to plutonium paves the way to the manufacture of
nuclear explosives by following a route that is far less demanding, technically
and financially, than it would be if uranium had been chosen as the source
materialiv. Be that as it may, the route that most likely was chosen by Israel to
manufacture nuclear explosives requires the availability of natural uranium and
heavy water. These are two essential requirements and, in the case of Israel, it
seems beyond doubt that both were fulfilled with the assistance of friendly
foreign governments.
It is believed that the US took a passive stance with regard to the development
of Israel's nuclear military industry. The Americans did not intervene nor did they
oppose Israeli efforts to develop nuclear weapons although they were aware of
them for quite some time. When they became convinced that such efforts were
actually under way, they did not approve but neither did they oppose themv. In
the 1960s, the Dimona facility was visited repeatedly by US inspectors who
found no evidence of “unauthorized” nuclear activities. The inspections were
announced beforehand and the Israelis took the trouble of building fake reactor
control rooms and walled-off the access to the lower floors where the
reprocessing of the plutonium produced by IRR2 was taking place. The
significant power rating as well as other reactor features did not go unnoticed
by the inspectors, who deemed that they were unnecessary for a purely civilian
facilityvi.
Israel's main partner in obtaining the required means to manufacture nuclear
explosives was France. The partnership began even before Charles de Gaulle
became France's president and lasted until 1964.
In 1957, an agreement was signed between France and Israel whereby the
former undertook to build an IRR2-type reactor with a power rating of 24 MW.
However, the cooling and waste disposal systems were designed for a threefold
power rating. In additional protocols to the agreement that were not put into
writing, the Paris authorities undertook to build a reprocessing plant for the
irradiated nuclear fuel, i.e. for the separation of plutonium. This industrial facility
was built in secret by French and Israeli experts in Dimona, in the Negev
desert, and outside the IAEA inspection system. The French purchased some
four tonnes of heavy water from Norway with the undertaking that they would
not be transferred to third countries. The heavy water was essential for the
operation of the reactor under construction. In fact, the heavy water was
secretly flown to Israel by the French Air Forcevii. When U2 spy planes detected
a large industrial complex being built in the Negev desert, David Ben-Gurion,
Israel's Prime Minister at the time, gave various explanations to the Americans,
referring to a textile plant, an agricultural development centre and a
metallurgical research facility! At the end of the 1960s, Ben-Gurion eventually
conceded that the Dimona complex was a nuclear research centre devoted to
“peaceful purposes”viii. Besides David Ben-Gurion, Shimon Peres was the main
person in charge of building the Dimona nuclear weapons production complexix.
After May 1960, the French government presided over by De Gaulle decided to
review its policy of nuclear cooperation with Israel. The French feared that the
country's international standing would be jeopardized once it became known
that it had assisted Israel in the establishment of a nuclear fuel reprocessing
facility which would allow the latter to stockpile plutonium that could be used for
military purposes. De Gaulle sought to persuade Ben-Gurion not to proceed
with the construction work in exchange for the supply of fighter planes to the
Israeli Armed Forces. A compromise was eventually reached whereby Israel
undertook not to develop nuclear weapons or to reprocess plutonium and to
disclose the existence of the reactor. France, on the other hand, promised to
deliver the nuclear fuel required to start the IRR 2 reactor and would not insist
on international inspections of the site. The nuclear reactor became operational
in 1964.
Without a facility to separate plutonium and one or more sources of natural
uranium, Israel would never have been able to develop a military nuclear
programme. As stated above, the plutonium separation facility was secretly built
underground at the Dimona complex with French assistance. As regards
uranium, Israel attempted to process phosphate-bearing minerals of which
there are deposits in the region. The aim was to extract uranium from a rock
known as phosphorite and to produce a uranium oxide that could be used as
nuclear fuel.
However, the procedure is too expensive in comparison with the extraction of
uranium from uranium ore in deposits such as those that were mined in
Portugal.
Satellite image of Dimona
nuclear complex in the
Negev desert
Hence, the Israelis decided to purchase uranium from countries willing to sell it
under conditions of great secrecy. Israel is known to have purchased 80 to100
tonnes of a mixture of uranium oxides known as “yellowcake”x from Argentina.xi
A second “discreet” purchase is thought to have taken place in mid-1968. This
time, 200 tonnes of “yellowcake” are believed to have been obtained from
Belgium in a complex clandestine operation involving an Italian company run by
the Israeli secret service and the transhipment of the uranium cargo at sea from
a European merchant ship to an Israeli vesselxii.
The significance of these purchases is that they are a strong indication of the
existence of a large-scale reprocessing facility for radioactive material in Israel,
a pre-condition for the development of a military nuclear programme. The
existence of such a facility was disclosed in 1986 by Mordechai Vanunu, an
Israeli Jew and a graduate from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, who had
worked as a nuclear technician in the Dimona complex. xiii
According to the Institute for Science and International Security (Mass., USA),
Israel's stock of plutonium for military purposes amounted to 560 kg by the end
of 2003, a figure that puts it slightly above that of India. xiv
One further issue is that of whether or not Israel has carried out nuclear tests.
This issue is closely related to the concern by nuclear powers to prohibit
nuclear tests and thus avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Several types
of nuclear tests are possible and so-called “zero power” or implosion tests are
difficult to detect from far away. Some sources consider it likely that the Israelis
carried out a nuclear test of this type in the Negev desert in 1966. Others claim
that a nuclear explosion believed to have occurred in the Southern Indian
Ocean in 1979 was the outcome of a partnership between Israel and South
Africa's apartheid regime.xv
Frederico Carvalho
July 2014
View of the command room of
the plutonium separation unit
(image sent to the Sunday
Times by Mordechai Vanunu
i North Korea is another state that remains outside the NPT. Available information about North
Korea is scarce and it is not possible to determine whether it has pre-operational nuclear
weapons and, if so, how many. Some sources suggest that the country could have as many as
6 to 8 nuclear devices.
ii The two submarines that were recently purchased for the Portuguese Navy are Trident Class
submarines, based on the German U-214 model. This was also the blueprint for the Israeli
Dolphin Class submarines, with adaptations that were agreed with the Israelis. The Trident
Class submarines have a launching system for 6 Harpoon UGM 84 missiles and 12 torpedoes.
iii The nuclear reactor IRR 1 came into service in 1960. Between 1960 and 1975, the USA
exported 19 kg of highly enriched uranium nuclear fuel to Israel, most of which were intended
for IRR 1. The IRR 1 is under the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards system.
iv Naturally-occurring uranium can only be used to manufacture explosives after it has been
enriched in isotope U-235. This is a procedure that requires technical skills and infrastructures
that are not easily available or established and that raise very sensitive international issues.
v In 1975, the US Administration declassified a significant number of top secret documents
which revealed that, at the time, the US was convinced that Israel had nuclear weapons.
vi Document from the Federation of Atomic Scientists (USA)
vii See previous endnote.
viii Idem, ibidem
ix “Israeli Nuclear Program Pioneered by Shimon Peres”, The Risk Report, Vol. 2 No.4 (July-
August 1996), Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control
x “Yellowcake” is a powdery substance composed of various uranium oxides. The main
component is uranium oxide with the chemical formula U3O8... “Yellowcake” is obtained from
naturally-occurring uranium ore by means of a series of physical (or mechanical) and chemical
procedures. The end-product is not yellow but rather brownish or black.
xi William Burr, Avner Cohen, “Israel's Secret Uranium Buy. How Argentina fueled Ben-Gurion's
nuclear program”, Foreign Policy, July 1, 2013
xii Idem, ibidem
xiii In 1986, 32-years old Vanunu disclosed classified information and provided the Sunday
Times with pictures of the nuclear facilities at the Dimona Centre while on a visit to London. He
was lured to Rome under false pretences and from there the Israeli secret service returned him
to Israel where he was tried and sentenced for treason. He remained in jail for 18 years, of
which 12 years in solitary confinement. He was released from prison in 2004 but lives in Israel
under close surveillance. His movements and contacts are restricted and he is not allowed to
leave the country. He has become a high profile whistleblower
xiv David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, Plutonium Watch-Tracking Plutonium Inventories, ISIS,
xv in Global Security Org, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nuclear Weapons Testing, page last
modified July 24, 2011 ( http://www.globalsecurity.org/
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