Russian Manipulation of Reactor Fuel Belies U.S. Iran Argument
by alethoBy Gareth Porter | IPS | May 19 2014
WASHINGTON
- In the stalemated talks between the six powers and Iran over the
future of the latter’s nuclear programme, the central issue is not so
much the technical aspects of the problem but the history of the Middle
Eastern country’s relations with foreign suppliers – and especially with
the Russians.
The
Barack Obama administration has dismissed Iran’s claim that it can’t
rely on the Russians or other past suppliers of enriched uranium for its
future needs. But the U.S. position ignores a great deal of historical
evidence that bolsters the Iranian case that it would be naïve to rely
on promises by Russia and others on which it has depended in the past
for nuclear fuel.
Both
Iran and the P5+1 are citing the phrase “practical needs”, which was
used in the Joint Plan of Action agreed to last November, in support of
their conflicting positions on the issue of how much enrichment
capability Iran should have. Limits on the Iranian programme are
supposed to be consistent with such “practical needs”, according to the
agreement.
Iran
has argued that its “practical needs” include the capability to enrich
uranium to make reactor fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant as well
as future nuclear reactors. Iranian officials have indicated that Iran
must be self-sufficient in the future with regard to nuclear fuel for
Bushehr, which Russia now provides. It announced in 2008 that another
reactor at Darkhovin, which is to be indigenously constructed, had
entered the design stage.
Former
senior State Department official on proliferation issues Robert Einhorn
has transmitted the thinking of the Obama administration about the
negotiations in recent months. In a long paper published in late March,
he wrote that Iran had “sometimes made the argument that they need to
produce enriched uranium indigenously because foreign suppliers could
cut off supplies for political or other reasons.”
The
Iranians had “even suggested,” Einhorn wrote, “that they could not
depend on Russia to be a reliable supplier of enriched fuel.” This
Iranian assertion ignores Russia’s defiance of the U.S. and is allies in
having built Bushehr and insisting on exempting its completion and
fuelling from U.N. Security Council sanctions, according to Einhorn.
Einhorn
omits, however, the well-documented history of blatant Russian
violations of its contract with Iran on Bushehr – including the
provision of nuclear fuel – and its effort to use Iranian dependence on
Russian reactor fuel to squeeze Iran on its nuclear policy as well as to
obtain political-military concessions from the United States.
Rose
Gottemoeller, now Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, described the dynamics of that Russian policy
when she was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from early 2006
through late 2008. She recounted in a 2008 paper how the Russians began
working intensively in 2002 to get Iran to end its uranium enrichment
programme.
That
brought Russia’s policy aim in regard to Iran’s nuclear programme into
line with that of the George W. Bush administration (2001-2009).
Russia
negotiated an agreement with Iran in February 2005 to supply enriched
uranium fuel for the reactor and to take back all spent fuel. Later in
2005, Moscow offered Iran a joint uranium enrichment venture in Russia
under which Iran would send uranium to Russia for enrichment and
conversion into fuel elements for future reactors.
But
Iran would not gain access to the fuel fabrication technology, which
made it unacceptable to Tehran but was strongly supported by the Bush
administration.
Bush
administration officials then began to dangle the prospect of a
bilateral agreement on nuclear cooperation – a “123 Agreement” – before
Russia as a means of leveraging a shift in Russian policy toward cutting
off nuclear fuel for Bushehr. The Russians agreed to negotiate such a
deal, which was understood to be conditional on Russia’s cooperation on
the Iran nuclear issue, with particular emphasis on fuel supplies for
Bushehr.
The
Russians were already using their leverage over Iran’s nuclear
programme by slowing down the work as the project approached completion.
A
U.S. diplomatic cable dated Jul. 6, 2006 and released by WikiLeaks
reported that Russ Clark, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
nuclear safety official who had spent time studying the Bushehr project,
said in a conversation with a U.S. diplomat, “[H]e almost feels sorry
for the Iranians because of the way the Russians are ‘jerking them
around’.”
Clark said the Russians were “dragging their feet” about completing work on Bushehr and suggested it was for political reasons.
The
IAEA official said it was obvious that the Russians were delaying the
fuel shipments to Bushehr because of “political considerations,”
calculating that, once they delivered the fuel, Russia would lose much
of its leverage over Iran.
In
late September 2006, the Russians changed the date on which they
pledged to provide the reactor fuel to March 2007, in anticipation of
completion of the reactor in September, in an agreement between the head
of Russia’s state-run company Atomstroyexport, and the vice-president
of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation.
But
in March 2007, the Russians announced that the fuel delivery would be
delayed again, claiming Iran had fallen behind on its payments. Iran,
however, heatedly denied that claim and accused Moscow of “politicising”
the issue.
In
fact, Russia, with U.S. encouragement, was “slow rolling out the supply
of enriched uranium fuel,” according to Gottemoeller. Moscow was making
clear privately, she wrote, that it was holding back on the fuel to
pressure Iran on its enrichment policy.
Moscow
finally began delivering reactor fuel to Bushehr in December 2007,
apparently in response to the Bush administration’s plan to put
anti-missile systems into the Czech Republic and Poland. That decision
crossed what Moscow had established as a “red line”.
Obama’s
election in November 2008, however, opened a new dynamic in U.S.-Russia
cooperation on squeezing Iran’s nuclear programme. Within days of
Obama’s cancellation of the Bush administration decision to establish
anti-missile sites in Central Europe in September 2009, Russian
officials leaked to the Moscow newspaper Kommersant that it was
withholding its delivery of S-300 surface-to-air missile systems for
which it had already contracted with Iran.
Iran
needed the missiles to deter U.S. and Israeli air attacks, so the
threat to renege on the deal was again aimed at enhancing Russian
leverage on Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment programme, while
giving Moscow additional influence on U.S. Russian policy as well.
The
Russian attempt to exploit Iran’s dependence on Moscow for its reactor
fuel for political purposes was not the first time that Iran had learned
the lesson that it could not rely on foreign sources of enriched
uranium – even when they had legal commitments to provide the fuel for
Iran’s nuclear reactor.
After
the Islamic revolution against the Shah in 1979, all of the foreign
suppliers on which Iran had expected to rely for nuclear fuel for
Bushehr and its Tehran Research Reactor reneged on their commitments.
Iran’s
permanent representative to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, sent an
official communication to IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano on Mar. 1,
2010, stating that specific contracts with U.S., German, French and
multinational companies for supply of nuclear fuel had been abruptly
terminated under pressure from the U.S. government and its allies.
Soltanieh
said they were “examples [of] the root cause of confidence deficit
vis-à-vis some Western countries regarding the assurance of nuclear
supply.”
The earlier experiences led Iran to decide around 1985 to seek its own indigenous enrichment capability, according to Iranian officials.
The earlier experiences led Iran to decide around 1985 to seek its own indigenous enrichment capability, according to Iranian officials.
The
experience with Russia, especially after 2002, hardened Iran’s
determination to be self-reliant in nuclear fuel fabrication. The IAEA’s
Clark told the U.S. diplomat in mid-2006 that, if the Russians did cut
off their supply of fuel for Bushehr, the Iranians were prepared to make
the fuel themselves.
It
is not clear whether the Obama administration actually believes the
official line that Iran should and must rely on Russia for nuclear fuel.
But the history surrounding the issue suggests that Iran will not
accept the solution on which the U.S. and its allies are now insisting.
~~~
Gareth
Porter, an investigative historian and journalist specialising in U.S.
national security policy, received the UK-based Gellhorn Prize for
journalism for 2011 for articles on the U.S. war in Afghanistan. His new
book “Manufactured Crisis: the Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare”,
was published Feb. 14.

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