What Brought the West to the Table
by alethoBy Kaveh L. Afrasiabi | Iran Review | May 20, 2014
There
is a widespread Western fallacy that "sanctions brought Iran to the
table," which serves to legitimize the unjust regime of sanctions
imposed by the Western governments, who rationalize their action by
claiming to be the "injured parties" under international law, with
respect to Iran's alleged "non-compliance" with its international
obligations.
The
problem with this perspective that has acquired the status of a
self-evident truth in the Western media is that it adopts the rhetoric
of Western governments at face value, without the slightest inquiry on
what caused the US and other Western governments involved in the nuclear
negotiations with Iran to also 'come to the table,' that is, make
reciprocal concessions?
The
answer to the above question is three-fold. First, the idea that the
Iran sanctions have caused little or no pressure on the Western
countries is, of course, suspect and can be easily debunked. On the
contrary, it can be shown that the whole edifice of sanctions regime was
experiencing growing pressures and the Geneva agreement reflected a
break not only for Iran but also the very sanctioning regimes, above all
the US and European Union (EU).
To
elaborate, given the fact that Iran's nuclear progress had continued
unabated despite the escalation of sanctions since 2006, the US was
poised to pass new sanction laws targeting Iran's oil sector, which if
passed would have adversely affected US's relations with some of its own
trade partners such as India and China. In the absence of a deal in
Geneva last November, the US lawmakers would have for sure enacted the
new legislation, which would have instantly introduced new distortions
in global trade, further violating the WTO norms on free trade. In other
words, the Geneva agreement was a timely rescuer for the Western
sanctioning states, avoiding a deterioration of their relations with
Iran's energy partners.
Second,
by the time of Geneva agreement the unilateral European sanctions had
come under increasing scrutiny by various courts in Europe, which had
struck down a growing number of banks, trading companies, and
individuals from the sanctions list. The significance of these adverse
rulings, dreaded by the US officials who lobbied unsuccessfully to
prevent them, was that it questioned the legality of some aspects of the
EU sanctions that went far beyond the scope of UN sanctions on Iran,
thus reflecting the irrefutable legal gap between UN and unilateral
sanctions.
Third,
in addition to the pressure of 'market-distorting' Western sanctions on
the sanctioning powers, who deprived their own corporations from
conducting profitable business with Iran, much to the delight of their
Asian competitors, another important factor that 'brought the West to
the table' was indeed the impressive pace of Iran's nuclear progress. As
a result of this steady progress, reflected in Iran's ability to
manufacture fuel rods for its medical reactor by enriching uranium up to
19.75%, i.e., the upper limit of low-enrichment, the West was suddenly
jolted into the realization that Iran had reached a new nuclear
milestone warranting serious negotiation.
Connected
to this at the same time was the lessening value of the "military card"
in West's hands, in light of Iran's construction of the underground
facility known as Fordo, which is relatively immune from aerial
bombardment, compared to the above-ground Natanz facility. This
instantly jettisoned the "Osirak option," that is the Israeli scenario
of knocking down Iran's facilities the way they did with ease against
Iraq in 1981, thus adding to the futility of military threats against
Iran. Needless to say, Iran's counter-threat of closing the Hormuz and
retaliating against any attacks throughout the region and beyond, i.e.,
the doctrine of extended deterrence, was an effective response that
raised the potential cost of any military adventures against Iran. A
good deal of this successful Iranian counter-strategy hinged on Iran's
extensive preparations for "asymmetrical warfare" and reliance on
missile defense, given the impressive Iranian advances in missile
technology.
Notwithstanding
the above-said, it is hardly surprising that faced with Iran's steady
nuclear progress despite the sanctions that had harmful effects on the
Western economy and entailed exorbitant monitoring costs, the West
agreed to climb down its maximalist demands on "zero centrifuges" and to
tacitly recognize Iran's right to a civilian fuel cycle.
Of
course, this explanation does not preclude the argument that the
escalation of sanctions adversely affected Iran's economy and spurred
the new government of Hassan Rouhani to prioritize the lifting of
sanctions through good-faith and principled negotiations. As an "injured
party" whose inalienable nuclear rights have been abridged by Western
discrimination and punitive actions, Iran's anti-sanctions quest is in
line with the nation's national interests. But, while so much attention
has been paid to Iran's motivation to 'make a deal' unfortunately so far
little attention has been paid to the underlying reasons for the West
to reciprocate Iran's action and thus explore the feasibility of a
"win-win" scenario.
In
terms of the regional and global geostrategic context, there are
undeniably a host of relevant factors such as the withdrawal of US and
NATO forces from the region after a decade of costly intervention and
the related concerns for stability 'the day after' their planned
departure, i.e., issues of direct link to Iran's role in regional
stability. Altogether, the net of Western interest to deal with Iran and
search for 'common grounds' has been expanding and, naturally, one must
probe the various economic, political, and geostrategic interests and
concerns of the Western governments led by the US in determining why
these powers consented to an interim deal with Iran, which has triggered
the current negotiations for a long-term agreement? Suffice to say that
the Western media's failure to pay attention to this side of equation
fuels a Western misperception that focuses on Iran's purported
weaknesses due to the sanctions, without bothering to present a
comprehensive picture that, as outlined above, presents a vastly
different, and more complex, picture before us, with clear policy
connotations.

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