Haaretz June 25 2015
The one thing you won’t find Israelis doing after UN report on Gaza war
The
United Nations might have minimal credibility in Israel, but that
shouldn’t exempt us from asking ourselves tough questions about the high
death toll in Gaza.
By Don Futterman
The one thing that will not result from the UN report on last summer’s Gaza war will be national soul-searching in Israel.
You
will hear angry tirades and endless justifications, and mostly the
familiar drumbeat that the United Nations is a den of vipers that
unfairly and systematically judges Israel by standards that it applies
to no other nation. Which of course, it does.
Here's
how most Israelis think about the most recent war in Gaza: We can't
bend our minds around other people's obtuseness – Hamas consciously and
deliberately murders civilian men, women and children of all ages, while
we seek only to defend ourselves. We won’t apologize for having better
weapons – we didn’t always have them – although we will shed a tear for
the many hundreds of civilians they made us kill. It’s sad but it’s
their fault, and their fault alone.
Since
the messenger, the United Nations, has no credibility in Israel, the
content of the report is almost beside the point, and the bias or
fairness of the commission’s chairperson is irrelevant. If the UN tries
to hold up a mirror to our actions, we will not look, just as we refused
to cooperate with their investigation. (Hamas also refused.)
The
report’s call to ship both Israeli and Hamas leaders off to the
International Criminal Court for possible war crimes deliberations gives
the game away. They want us in the docks to answer charges ignored in
other contexts across the globe, while we know that it is impossible to
commit war crimes against terrorists.
Would it have mattered if the report had been published by someone else?
It’s
doubtful. The beauty of the Netanyahu worldview – that everyone is
against Israel – is that it comes with the freedom of never having to
engage with issues. External criticism by definition comes from enemies.
Self-examination is conflated and confounded with self-flagellation, or
in the case of leftist critics from within, with treason. Rather than
engaging with any critique, the government compels critics to spend all
their time defending their legitimacy in speaking out.
So
it’s difficult to hear the criticisms through the noise of our own
self-righteous breast-beating. Since I find the report flawed and
incomplete, it is with some anxiety that I would like to engage one of
its points: the scale of the killing.
Most
Israelis determined that because Hamas started hostilities by firing
rockets indiscriminately at our civilians, and refused to stop firing,
then all the blame falls upon the Palestinians. We had far greater
firepower than Hamas and we opted to use it often, although not as often
as we could have, and not indiscriminately. If the world doesn’t
understand our behavior, let them try to live under ongoing mortar and
rocket attack.
Most
Israelis decided that the principle of proportionality doesn’t apply to
us, since Hamas continued attacking Israeli civilians even when we
showed them that we were not going to restrain ourselves.
Proportionality does seem a bizarre idea in wartime. Other than
preventing mutual assured destruction, who holds back? Didn’t the U.S.
try to bomb Iraq back to the Stone Age? And what about Russia, or Assad,
or ISIS?
But
if the casualty figures don’t disturb us, don’t make us tremble, then
something is wrong. So here is the one thing I would ask other Israelis
to think about: We killed massive numbers of Palestinians, including
whole families and large parts of many families, and the skyrocketing
death toll did not make us change our tactics.
Was this justified?
If
we were trying to send a message that Jews are not willing to be
victimized any longer and are not afraid to kill, did we need to keep
sending that message all summer?
Once
we saw that our efforts to warn civilians in advance did not prevent
the startling death tolls, that they were either ineffective or
insufficient, why didn’t we change course?
Was every one of our bombs and missiles critical, every Palestinian victim necessary to our war aims?
What
did our leaders believe we would gain from killing so many civilians?
Were we trying to wear the Palestinians down into submission? Did we
believe this would be the quickest way to end the conflict?
The
global support we garnered during the first week of the war evaporated
as the casualties mounted. What made our leaders believe that we would
never be required to answer for all those deaths?
You
will find little public debate of these issues in Israel because Israel
feels besieged, both because we have no shortage of enemies, and
because our leaders thrive on their “us against the world” paradigm.
Only our victimization – which is genuine but not exclusive – may be
recognized.
The
Jewish tradition of tokhekha – roughly, rebuke or constructive
criticism – will have an impact only if the listener is open to hearing
it. Israeli society is not there yet. I suspect we never will be,
because the next round of battle will likely deliver reams of new
grievances and another UN report before we pause to reconsider the
morality of our actions last summer.
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