America's Dangerous Bargain With Turkey
WASHINGTON
-- AFTER a year of intense diplomatic negotiations, the Turkish
government is now permitting the United States to use Turkey's Incirlik
Air Base, which will allow American aircraft to fly missions in Syria
and Iraq with greater operational effectiveness and economic efficiency.
The
price of this agreement, however, may well be too high in the long run,
both for the success of America's anti-Islamic State campaign and for
the stability of Turkey.
That's because the Turkish government's
recent change of heart and its sudden willingness to allow American
access to the Incirlik base was driven by domestic political
considerations, rather than a fundamental rethinking of its Syria
strategy.
Shortly after granting access to the base, Turkey's
president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, launched a wave of airstrikes on
Kurdish targets, reigniting a conflict that had been on the road to
resolution. To make matters worse, Turkey has struck hard at Syrian
Kurds who have, until now, been America's most reliable ally in fighting
the Islamic State, often called ISIS, in northern Syria.
American
and Turkish policies toward Syria were always rooted in different
visions of what Syria would look like if the regime of President Bashar
al-Assad fell.
Washington's policy has been inconsistent and
vague, but it always envisioned a post-Assad Syria that would be
pluralistic and guarantee minority rights. Turkey recognized early on
that Mr. Assad's brutal policies would lead to radicalization, but the
Turkish policy of seeking a Sunni-dominated Syria, governed by forces
rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood, has not helped matters.
Mr.
Erdogan's preference for Sunni dominance explains Turkey's lax border
policies over the past four years, as well as its tacit support for the
extremist Sunni group the Nusra Front, and its failure to take the
Islamic State seriously as a threat until the fall of Mosul and the
beheadings of Western hostages. Even then, Turkey was reluctant to
change course and fully back the American goal of degrading and
defeating the militant group.
Mr. Erdogan's overriding objective
has instead been to achieve a parliamentary supermajority that will
grant him an executive presidency and solidify what is rapidly becoming a
one-party state. Since his party lost its governing majority in the
June elections, dashing his desires, he has focused on forcing early
elections -- now set for November -- to regain control of Parliament.
To
do so, Mr. Erdogan hopes to tar the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic
Party as a terrorist front and steal votes from the Nationalist Movement
Party. He has used the current crisis as a smoke screen behind which to
launch an air war against militants from the Kurdistan Workers' Party,
or P.K.K., in Iraq and artillery strikes on the Democratic Union Party,
or P.Y.D., in Syria. He has also unleashed a new wave of repression
aimed at Kurds in Turkey, which risks plunging the country into civil
war.
This strategy might help Mr. Erdogan win an election, but it
is severely undermining the fight against the Islamic State. By
disrupting logistics and communications links between the P.K.K. in Iraq
and the P.Y.D. in Syria, Turkey is weakening the most effective ground
force fighting the Islamic State in Syria: the Kurds.
We would do
well to remember that it was P.Y.D. forces, with logistical support and
reinforcement from the P.K.K., that liberated the city of Kobani last
year and recently retook Tal Abyad, cutting off a key route for
infiltration of arms and foreign fighters for the Islamic State.
America's
agreement with Turkey might yield more effective airstrikes, but that
will come at the cost of losing the valuable real-time intelligence
provided by Kurdish forces that is so crucial for targeting purposes.
In
the long run, undercutting the Kurds will be extremely damaging to the
anti-Islamic State effort since allowing Turkey to create a no-go zone
for Kurdish forces will not carve out territory for moderate fighters;
instead, it risks creating a safe haven for Islamist groups like the
Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham, whose growing strength will exacerbate
the toxic sectarianism and ethnic violence that has plagued Syria for
the past four years.
Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter's
recent declaration that "we do want Turkey to do more in the fight"
against the Islamic State prompted a pledge by Turkey's foreign minister
to step up its airstrikes against the group. But this raises the
question of whether or not Turkey will call off its war against the
Kurds.
If not, America's deal with Turkey will prove to be a
Faustian bargain. Short-term operational convenience is not worth the
long-term danger of destabilizing Turkey and demoralizing the Kurdish
forces that have carried the bulk of the burden in fighting militants.
An
ally racked by violence and insurgency simply can't play the role that
the United States needs a secular, democratic Turkey to play in the
turbulent Middle East.
Fortunately, America does have leverage.
Turkish officials desperately crave the approval of their counterparts
in Washington; the United States must not grant it.
Instead, the
Obama administration should restrict Turkey's access to senior-level
meetings, reduce intelligence cooperation and withhold American support
for Turkey in international financial institutions in the likely event
that Mr. Erdogan's policies precipitate an economic crisis.
Getting
Turkish leaders to change course will be extremely difficult, but it is
imperative to pressure them if Turkey is to avoid being sucked into the
vortex created by a failed Syria policy and Mr. Erdogan's dogged quest
for absolute political power.
Friday, August 28, 2015
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