Isolated in Brussels: Merkel Clashes with EU Commission [part 2]
REUTERS
Angela Merkel at the recent EU summit on Dec. 19 in Brussels:
The chancellor has become bogged down in her attempt to lead the Europe.
Part 2: An Unruly Commission
The sheer size of the European Commission is indeed a problem. But
because each country ultimately wants to keep its own commissioner, in
May the heads of state and government, including Merkel, rejected a plan
to reduce the number of commissioners, which was in fact stipulated by
treaty. As a result, the center of power in Brussels, with a total of 28
commissioners, will remain almost twice as large as the German cabinet.
This leads to bizarrely structured areas of responsibility. For
instance, Commissioner Androulla Vassilious, who is from Cyprus, is in
charge of culture, even though the European Commission, under the Lisbon
Treaty, has no right to intervene in this area. Maltese native Tonio
Borg is also in charge of something that the EU has no authority to
regulate: health policy. Four other commissioners share foreign policy
responsibilities: Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Catherine Ashton,
Great Britain), EU Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy (Stefan Füle,
Czech Republic), Humanitarian Aid (Kristalina Georgieva, Bulgaria) and
Development Policy (Andris Piebalgs, Latvia).
Berlin officials feel that the Commission is not taken seriously where it should be. Only 10 percent of the Commission's recommendations to EU member states on issues of economic policy were actually implemented in 2012. The Commission skeptics at the Chancellery suspect that there is something very fundamental behind this. They note that in the wake of the acute euro crisis, major reform decisions are now on the agenda, which will no longer be assigned to Brussels officials, because only national governments can justify them to their parliaments and citizens. "Only nation states can justify the reforms that are now truly necessary," says one of Merkel's key advisers. A pension reform in one country and a relaxation of protections against employee dismissal in another are not the kinds of issues that can be entrusted to the "communitized competency" of the European Commission, say German officials. Decisions with such explosive domestic force for national governments can only be made by the governments themselves -- within the European Counil, the powerful body comprised of the leaders of the 28 EU member states.
In this context, Merkel recently came out as either a winner or a loser. But in most cases she was largely alone.
The Germans prevailed with her ideas for a banking union, against the conceivably broad resistance of the remaining 17 euro countries. For months, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) had been reluctant to grant the European Commission the last word in the liquidation of ailing banks, and he prevailed in the end. In the future, representatives of national liquidation agencies will decide which lenders are to be shut down, if necessary. Although the European Commission can oppose the vote, the finance ministers of the member states, that is, Schäuble and his counterparts, can remove the Commissioners' objection.
The decision on the banking union paves the way for more extensive and deeper integration. But in a departure from the policies of the past, the step chiefly strengthens the rights and powers of the member states, not the Commission. The move had Germany's handwriting all over it, but it also led to new tensions. When the finance ministers were about to toast the agreement with sparkling wine, a Southern European diplomat reportedly turned away, according to the Süddeutsche Zeitung newspaper. Everything tasted German on that evening, the diplomat apparently said, and "I don't drink German sparkling wine."
An Unresolved Euro Crisis Dispute
This resentment stems from the unresolved dispute over the right approach in the euro crisis and the lessons to be drawn from it. In 2010, to be able to monitor debtor nations more closely, Merkel almost singlehandedly ensured that the IMF would assume part of the control over bailout programs, and not the European Commission alone. Since then, Germany, using its domestic "Agenda 2010" -- a package of reforms undertaken by former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to reduce long-term unemployment benefits and otherwise streamline the social security system -- as a model, has pressured the southern countries to implement reforms and austerity programs. They, in turn, want Berlin to promote German domestic consumption more heavily, invest more and export fewer goods to other euro countries.
No one can force Germany, the perceived class geek, to do so. But at the most recent summit, the other EU leaders at least had the strength to put a stop to Merkel. She had emphatically proposed a common, coordinated economic policy in which the euro countries would commit themselves to structural reforms in individually tailored agreements. "If we do not embark on further reforms, we will eventually run into trouble again," Merkel warned at a dinner of the heads of state and government. But not even traditionally pro-German countries like Austria, the Netherlands and Finland agreed with her proposal, let alone the Southern Europeans.
"I don't need these reform agreements," Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy snapped. "I don't need anyone else to tell me about reforms, because I've already done that." Merkel's concept was "simply half-baked," Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann said critically. Merkel continued to pursue the idea and bluntly warned that if individual countries ran into trouble again soon, they could not expect to see any German money. "Don't think that the Bundestag will rush to their assistance again." But her arguments fell on deaf ears. Her idea was postponed, in a serious setback for Merkel.
At the beginning of 2014, Merkel's new, German Europe is still up in the air, facing resistance from the Commission and with hardly any support from other member states. And her next move is to mobilize the Christian Social Union (CSU), the CDU's Bavarian sister party, to take a more general anti-European approach.
The CSU is planning a European election campaign that is decidedly anti-Brussels, as indicated by a four-page strategy document drafted by the CSU regional committee for the traditional meeting of its members of parliament in the Bavarian resort town of Wildbad Kreuth. "We need a withdrawal therapy for commissioners intoxicated with regulation," the document, titled "Europe's Future: Freedom, Security, Regionalism and Public Responsiveness," reads. One of the stated goals of the document is to reduce the size of the European Commission. The CSU proposes the establishment of a new court to take tougher action against the Brussels agency exceeding its authority. "Disputes are to be decided by a European competency court, which would include constitutional judges from the member states." The CSU proposes that referendums be held for important EU decisions, and that EU powers generally be transferred back to the member states. "This could apply to parts of the overregulated internal market, as well as regional policy," the document reads.
The chancellor doesn't want to go that far. But her pivot away from Germany's traditional policy on Europe is also easy to misunderstand. Merkel wants less "Brussels" but "more Europe." But to bring joint control into the Brussels body to which she belongs, the European Council, Merkel must publicly confront the European Commission with its mistakes, so as to deprive it of some of its power. The opponents of Europe are just waiting for that, even in their own camp -- and they are far from satisfied with merely a little more emphasis on the German language in Brussels offices.
BY NIKOLAUS BLOME, PETER MÜLLER, CHRISTIAN REIERMANN, GREGOR PETER SCHMITZ AND CHRISTOPH SCHULT
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
Berlin officials feel that the Commission is not taken seriously where it should be. Only 10 percent of the Commission's recommendations to EU member states on issues of economic policy were actually implemented in 2012. The Commission skeptics at the Chancellery suspect that there is something very fundamental behind this. They note that in the wake of the acute euro crisis, major reform decisions are now on the agenda, which will no longer be assigned to Brussels officials, because only national governments can justify them to their parliaments and citizens. "Only nation states can justify the reforms that are now truly necessary," says one of Merkel's key advisers. A pension reform in one country and a relaxation of protections against employee dismissal in another are not the kinds of issues that can be entrusted to the "communitized competency" of the European Commission, say German officials. Decisions with such explosive domestic force for national governments can only be made by the governments themselves -- within the European Counil, the powerful body comprised of the leaders of the 28 EU member states.
In this context, Merkel recently came out as either a winner or a loser. But in most cases she was largely alone.
The Germans prevailed with her ideas for a banking union, against the conceivably broad resistance of the remaining 17 euro countries. For months, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) had been reluctant to grant the European Commission the last word in the liquidation of ailing banks, and he prevailed in the end. In the future, representatives of national liquidation agencies will decide which lenders are to be shut down, if necessary. Although the European Commission can oppose the vote, the finance ministers of the member states, that is, Schäuble and his counterparts, can remove the Commissioners' objection.
The decision on the banking union paves the way for more extensive and deeper integration. But in a departure from the policies of the past, the step chiefly strengthens the rights and powers of the member states, not the Commission. The move had Germany's handwriting all over it, but it also led to new tensions. When the finance ministers were about to toast the agreement with sparkling wine, a Southern European diplomat reportedly turned away, according to the Süddeutsche Zeitung newspaper. Everything tasted German on that evening, the diplomat apparently said, and "I don't drink German sparkling wine."
An Unresolved Euro Crisis Dispute
This resentment stems from the unresolved dispute over the right approach in the euro crisis and the lessons to be drawn from it. In 2010, to be able to monitor debtor nations more closely, Merkel almost singlehandedly ensured that the IMF would assume part of the control over bailout programs, and not the European Commission alone. Since then, Germany, using its domestic "Agenda 2010" -- a package of reforms undertaken by former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to reduce long-term unemployment benefits and otherwise streamline the social security system -- as a model, has pressured the southern countries to implement reforms and austerity programs. They, in turn, want Berlin to promote German domestic consumption more heavily, invest more and export fewer goods to other euro countries.
No one can force Germany, the perceived class geek, to do so. But at the most recent summit, the other EU leaders at least had the strength to put a stop to Merkel. She had emphatically proposed a common, coordinated economic policy in which the euro countries would commit themselves to structural reforms in individually tailored agreements. "If we do not embark on further reforms, we will eventually run into trouble again," Merkel warned at a dinner of the heads of state and government. But not even traditionally pro-German countries like Austria, the Netherlands and Finland agreed with her proposal, let alone the Southern Europeans.
"I don't need these reform agreements," Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy snapped. "I don't need anyone else to tell me about reforms, because I've already done that." Merkel's concept was "simply half-baked," Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann said critically. Merkel continued to pursue the idea and bluntly warned that if individual countries ran into trouble again soon, they could not expect to see any German money. "Don't think that the Bundestag will rush to their assistance again." But her arguments fell on deaf ears. Her idea was postponed, in a serious setback for Merkel.
At the beginning of 2014, Merkel's new, German Europe is still up in the air, facing resistance from the Commission and with hardly any support from other member states. And her next move is to mobilize the Christian Social Union (CSU), the CDU's Bavarian sister party, to take a more general anti-European approach.
The CSU is planning a European election campaign that is decidedly anti-Brussels, as indicated by a four-page strategy document drafted by the CSU regional committee for the traditional meeting of its members of parliament in the Bavarian resort town of Wildbad Kreuth. "We need a withdrawal therapy for commissioners intoxicated with regulation," the document, titled "Europe's Future: Freedom, Security, Regionalism and Public Responsiveness," reads. One of the stated goals of the document is to reduce the size of the European Commission. The CSU proposes the establishment of a new court to take tougher action against the Brussels agency exceeding its authority. "Disputes are to be decided by a European competency court, which would include constitutional judges from the member states." The CSU proposes that referendums be held for important EU decisions, and that EU powers generally be transferred back to the member states. "This could apply to parts of the overregulated internal market, as well as regional policy," the document reads.
The chancellor doesn't want to go that far. But her pivot away from Germany's traditional policy on Europe is also easy to misunderstand. Merkel wants less "Brussels" but "more Europe." But to bring joint control into the Brussels body to which she belongs, the European Council, Merkel must publicly confront the European Commission with its mistakes, so as to deprive it of some of its power. The opponents of Europe are just waiting for that, even in their own camp -- and they are far from satisfied with merely a little more emphasis on the German language in Brussels offices.
BY NIKOLAUS BLOME, PETER MÜLLER, CHRISTIAN REIERMANN, GREGOR PETER SCHMITZ AND CHRISTOPH SCHULT
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